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Abstract 
The increased exploration cruise ship to the Norwegian High Arctic has raised questions of 
how salvage of people needing evacuation from a ship in the area should take place. The 
concept of emergency response logistics represents a research field still in early stages. The 
context of the study is the increased exploration cruise activity taking place in Arctic waters, 
along with the particular natural conditions’ characteristic for the High Arctic and existing 
SAR agreements. This paper seeks to explore how variables such as helicopter capacities and 
fuel depots can affect the rescue capacity, response time of Search and Rescue helicopters 
and number of people being evacuated if a mass-evacuation is necessary.  
Keywords: High Arctic, Arctic waters, Expedition cruise ships, Search and Rescue, 
Emergency Response Logistics, Helicopter bases, Helicopter capacities, Mass Evacuation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
Summary 
In rural Arctic seas, time and distance to available emergency response resources is critical if 
a serious accident in the maritime or petroleum sector occurs, exceeding the vessel`s or 
installation`s own emergency response system. A serious and potentially catastrophic ship 
accident will require assistance from emergency response resources provided by the given 
nearby ships or national emergency response services. If a ship accident occurs, requiring a 
mass evacuation from the accident site, helicopter range capacities can be critical for the 
outcome. 
Over the last few years, ship traffic in waters north of 78 degrees has increased with more 
ships and offshore installations that have brought a large growth in the number of people to 
visit this part of the world. An effective evacuation following a ship distress call will depend 
upon the ship’s own resources and capabilities but also on how far the distance is to the 
emergency responders, which will likely include coast guard ships, other vessels and search 
and rescue helicopters. The locations of helicopter bases can have a major impact on the result 
of a rescue operation. 
Responding to a ship emergency far from the Norwegian mainland is a complex logistical 
operation. The arctic climate itself adds additional challenges such as cold temperatures that 
may affect survival and a vulnerable environment that is extremely exposed to the damages 
oil and other chemicals from the ship may cause. Weather conditions can be harsh and 
directly affect a rescue operation. 
Through bilateral and multilateral agreements, Norway has under the laws enforced by 
amongst others the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, an obligation to have an 
emergency preparedness and response system in place for maritime emergencies. The 
member countries of the Arctic Council have signed an SAR agreement for the High North, 
where Norway’s responsibility includes zones stretching up to the North Pole.  The increased 
activity in Arctic waters has led to additional resources being added to the national emergency 
response, but there is still a need to strengthen this readiness to ensure a robust and adequate 
response to significant incidents and accidents in Arctic waters, including when taking into 
account that passenger and exploration ships in the area tend to increase both in size and 
number of crew and passengers.  
A number of suggestions for improving response capabilities have arisen from various 
sources due to the increased activity in the arctic maritime region. Norway is responsible for a 
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large oceanic territorial area with demanding conditions, leading to logistical challenges that 
are not covered fully with Coast Guard and rescue ships. The locations of helicopter bases on 
the mainland with available emergency response capabilities such as rescuers and medical 
crew are of high importance if a serious accident happens in a rural area in Arctic waters. 
Today Norwegian SAR helicopter services are established in seven different helicopter bases.  
This thesis has the purpose of outlining the complexity of logistics during an emergency 
response situation involving SAR helicopters in Arctic waters, and further to examine the 
response time of available resources and to look more closely at the location of helicopter 
bases and the extend of helicopter capacities considering the increased maritime activities 
taking place in the high north.  
The complexity of the logistics and solving emergency preparedness challenges in a 
demanding maritime arctic environment is a task that requires input from several viewpoints. 
Starting with outlining relevant laws and regulations, in addition to international 
commitments made by Norway to contribute to Emergency Prevention Preparedness 
Response in the Arctic, this paper further examines the available empirical and theoretical 
material. Empirical data and important information from interviews with informants from 
some of the main SAR actors operating in the Arctic are further presented. An analysis is 
done to answer the research questions. The thesis then presents the concluding remarks and 
suggests areas that are recommended subjects for further research. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Increased research, exploration and expedition activity along with commercial fisheries in 
Arctic waters place great demands on emergency response players in the High North. The  
Arctic consists of 18 million square km sea and only 4 million people are located on the 8 
million square kilometers of land (Lauta et al., 2018) The polar sea waters have experienced a 
steady growth in voyages from the expedition tourism branch and the ships calling at the 
northernmost ports in the world have increasing passenger capacities. Several challenges can 
be faced by the actors involved in rescue operations in polar waters and the rapid mobilisation 
of sufficient rescue resources and capacities can be decisive for the outcome of major events. 
(Andreassen and Borch, 2018). Oil and gas activities, together with the many cargo and 
fishing vessels located in Arctic waters, require continuous preparedness from land-based 
resources that can respond rapidly to an accident. Arctic waters pose challenges such as icing 
and darkness. Communication even via satellite can be challenging and limited knowledge 
about the area and missing infrastructure can be factors that contribute to larger, serious 
events (Andreassen and Borch, 2018) 
The Norwegian Rescue Service is operated as a collaboration between public and private 
emergency response actors. All public bodies with rescue resources are obliged to contribute 
to rescue services with the resources available (St.mld. No. 86). In Norway, the rescue service 
– “ Norwegian Rescue Model ”-  is subject to the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Planning 
with the Main Rescue Centers North Norway and Southern Norway (JRCC) as the closest 
players to the local rescue centres (Jamtli, 2014) 
In 2011, Norway signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2011) along with the seven other permanent 
member states in the Arctic Council: the United States of America, Canada, Russia, Finland, 
Sweden, Kingdom of Denmark also representing also Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and 
Iceland (Arctic Council, 2015) This Agreement commits Norway to assist with SAR 
resources and respond to events in their own agreed territorial areas, and also to provide 
support to incidents that occur in the signatory member states`  territorial responsibility areas. 
The agreement further refers to the SAR convention and Chicago Convention as a basis for 
how search and rescue operations shall be conducted. A political consensus exists among the 
parties to ensure efficient SAR services in the High North, with a focus on cross - border 
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support through the Host Nation System (HNS) (Andreassen et al.,  2018). The HNS interacts 
with crisis management based on various principles, among these the responsibility - 
principle, which state that the organisations responsible for a distress area are also responsible 
for providing emergency preparedness efforts in case of a crisis or catastrophic event (ibid.,  
2018: 364). This principle substantiates the large responsibility for emergency preparedness 
undertaken by Norwegian authorities, taking into account their substantial area of 
responsibility in the High North. 
The IAMSAR manual provides additional guidelines on the Agreement (The Agreement, 
Article 7).  Helicopter resources will most likely represent the most rapid response to a ship 
accident if evacuation of passengers and crew is necessary. The recent event involving the 
Norwegian trawler Northguider grounding in Hinlopenstredet demonstrated that helicopter 
assistance was the only passable solution for response and evacuation of the crew, as the 
nearest ship with adequate SAR resource was more than a 24 - hour voyage away from the 
location of the accident. This shipwreck occurred during the winter in a harsh and cold 
environment more than 80 degrees north in a fjord in Spitsbergen, Svalbard.  
International maritime safety measures have been addressed by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) and have been implemented during recent years. One example is the  
Polar Code which is now part of SOLAS regulations. Although environmental protective 
requirements apply to all ships operating in polar areas, the safety aspect including emergency 
preparedness and measures taken to implement for instance personal survival kits for crew 
and passengers aiming for survival on ice for five days, does not apply to fishing vessels or 
smaller passenger vessels carrying less than 12 passengers.  
It is also relevant to question whether it would have been practically possible to survive for 
several days outside a passenger or cargo vessel when the area where this shipwreck occurred 
had a temperature of well below -20 degrees and was in complete darkness. It the case of the 
Northguider incident, helicopter rescue services were vital for a successful outcome. 
Available survival kits supplied for survival in the Arctic may help the length of survival of 
the crew and passengers of a ship; however these kits have been tested with various results 
and a serious distress- situation will still require a rapid evacuation of those involved.  
There is already an arctic exploration cruise expedition company offering arctic adventures 
from Longyearbyen to the remote Frans Josefs Land at 80North, 47East. The 297 ft long 
Sea Spirit carrying a crew of 72 and with passenger capacities of 114, offers an Arctic cruise 
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to areas where few have been able to sail (Poseidon Expeditions, 2019). The Norwegian 
Hurtigruten will join the remote exploration cruise to Frans Josefs Land in 2019 with their 
ship Spitsbergen, a vessel able to carry 243 passengers (The Barents Observer, 2018). 
Hurtigruten will sail via Murmansk, but Norwegian Authorities must still be expected to 
contribute in case of an incident requiring a possible evacuation as the route is close to their 
SAR area of responsibility and authorities are obliged by the Agreement signed by their 
fellow arctic countries. 
 
1.1 Norwegian Search and Rescue helicopters  
The background for the public Norwegian rescue helicopter services was several serious 
accidents at sea after the Second World War. In 1966, Norway had no established Rescue 
Helicopter service, and had to get assistance from a Danish Search and Rescue helicopter in 
the SAR operation connected to the M/F Skagerak sinking. The Ministry of Justice then 
started to plan for the procurement of 10 Search and Rescue helicopters. Sea King helicopters 
were initially produced for locating submarines, but were later used for search and rescue 
operations. The procurement ended with the purchase of 10 SAR Westland Sea King 
helicopters, later supplemented with 2 additional Sea King machines, which still form the 
foundation of the Norwegian Search and Rescue helicopter services today. The Sea King 
helicopters were delivered in 1973 and are located at the six Norwegian mainland bases with 
a 15 - minutes response time from when an emergency notification is received. In 1994, the 
Governor of Svalbard oversaw the installation of one fully equipped Super Puma helicopter 
based in Longyearbyen (NOU 1997:3,::22-23).  This helicopter was later supplemented with 
another similar SAR helicopter. 
Norwegian Search and Rescue helicopter services are today located at seven main bases; 
Rygge, Sola, Florø, Ørland, Bodø, Banak and Longyearbyen. The helicopters are owned by 
Norway `s Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and are operated by Norwegian armed 
forces, where the 330 Squadron is the operator of rescue helicopter services at all bases except 
Longyearbyen,  where the two AS332L1 SAR helicopters are operated by the civilian 
company Lufttransport. 
Norway ordered a total of 16 new SAR helicopters of the model AW101 scheduled for 
delivery before 2020. These will replace the existing Sea King Helicopters operated from the 
six mainland bases. The new helicopter project is characterised as the Norwegian All-Weather 
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Search And Rescue Helicopter (NAWSARH). The NAWSARH project includes an option for 
securing a delivery of up to six more AW101 helicopters for mainland and island bases before 
2022. 
  
1.2 Purpose of this paper 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether Norway will have the necessary helicopter 
emergency readiness resources available if a major ship distress situation occurs in remote 
areas based on the scheduled sailing routes of expedition cruise ships. A major logistic 
emergency mass evacuation operation will be required in order to rescue several hundred 
passengers and crew members from a large exploration cruise ship in the Norwegian Arctic 
and carry them to the mainland or a safe area.  
Further, this paper seeks to explore appropriate measures that can strengthen the emergency 
response logistic situation, enabling Norwegian authorities to be prepared in the best possible 
way to respond to a ship accident in their high north geographical maritime area of 
responsibility, according to the various SAR agreements signed.  
 
1.3 Research question 
To visualise the full extent of the aspects the research questions seek to answer, relevant 
factors affecting the emergency response logistic are taken into consideration. These include 
dependent variables such as rescue capacity, response time of SAR helicopters and number of 
people involved. Further, several intermediate variables are part of the relevant factors 
included, such as helicopter resource type, including the existing Sea King and Super Puma 
and the new NAWSARH AW101, location of SAR helicopter bases and location of fuel 
depots. Lastly, the research model consists of factors including dimensional variables such as 
traffic patterns, time of year and natural conditions and SAR Agreements. These are all 
variables that should be considered when examining emergency response logistics in the 
Norwegian High North. 
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Figure 1: Research model.  
The context is compromised by the independent variables shown in the model, representing 
the increased activity of cruise ships in the High North, the traffic patterns of expedition 
cruise vessels, the special natural condition’s characteristic of the Arctic, and present 
agreements and regulations for emergency response. The analytical model further visualises 
the relationship between independent variables which are affected by the intermediate 
variables, affecting the outcome of a situation, such as helicopter type and location of bases 
and fuel depot. These intermediate variables are closely examined in this paper. From the 
intermediate variables, the model moves on to the dependent variables, looking at how the 
factors rescue capacity, response time, number of people involved can be affected by the 
intermediate variables. 
The dimensional variables in the research model are those limiting the contextual operational 
conditions. The traffic patterns of adventure cruises have during recent years been established 
increasingly further North in order to attract those seeking adventurous and spectacular 
experiences. The natural conditions of the Arctic are also a dimensional variable, as the 
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conditions include ice- covered waters, cold and harsh climate, limitations in sea mapping, 
and possible limitations in communication coverage. Existing agreements and regulations, 
both international maritime regulations and national and international signed SAR and 
emergency response agreements constitute the framework for Arctic maritime operations.   
One of the three intermediate variables in this paper is helicopter types, and is decisive for 
operational range, speed and passenger capacity. We will look more closely at the capabilities 
of the existing Sea King and Super Puma search and rescue helicopters compared to the new 
AW101 NAWSAR helicopter currently being phased in as an SAR helicopter in Norway. 
Further, the base location of SAR helicopters affects the response time and the capability to 
successfully complete an SAR mission. The last of the intermediate variables in this research 
model is the location of the fuel depots, in case of fuelling need during an emergency 
response. 
The dependent variables include the rescue capacity available in case of a major cruise ship 
emergency necessitating an evacuation. In this paper, helicopter capacity and helicopter type 
are the main focus when discussing rescue capacity. The response time is the time from when 
a distress message is sent p to when SAR units arrive the casualty site. This paper will 
essentially focus on SAR helicopters, but the response time of maritime SAR resources will 
also be debated. The number of people onboard are highly relevant as a dependent variable, as 
a ship with several hundred passengers and crew will require a far more extensive SAR 
operation than a smaller vessel in distress.  
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This paper seeks to contribute to the studies related to emergency response logistics in Arctic 
waters. The term Emergency response logistics (ERL) can be defined as the `Activation (and 
re-activation) of emergency resources and cooperation between contingency actors at an 
undesirable event` (Hammervoll, 2014:17) 
and the overall research question is: 
Emergency response logistics in the High Arctic - What is the relation between expedition 
cruise activity and helicopter capabilities in the meaning of a) location and b) helicopter type 
for mass evacuation in the Norwegian High Arctic?   
Sub-question 1: 
What evacuation capacities are required in terms of response time and the number of persons 
needing evacuation on board an expedition cruise ship in the Norwegian High North?    
Sub-question 2   
In which areas is there a need for rescue helicopter coverage in case a ship evacuation is 
necessary? Increasing cruise and maritime transport activities in Arctic waters continue to 
expand Norway` s area of SAR response responsibilities  
Sub-question 3  
How do contextual factors such as weather and distance to hospitals influence evacuation 
capacity needs? How do evacuation capacity needs influence helicopter capabilities in the 
terms of a) helicopter SAR capacity and b) location?   
 
1.4 Research limitations of the thesis 
It was necessary to delineate and limit the scope of the research for this paper in order to 
focus on SAR helicopters based on the mainland and on Svalbard and further SAR helicopter 
capabilities seen in connection with expedition cruises in the high north.  
This scope was chosen as the increased expedition activity appears to have little linear 
correlation with the amount of emergency response helicopter resources provided to the 
mainland. An additional base in Troms can support and strengthen the overall rescue capacity 
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both locally and in an event calling for additional resources being mobilised from the 
mainland to north of Svalbard to support the SAR helicopters stationed in Longyearbyen.  
Several areas of research could have made interesting subjects for a thesis, e.g. factors such as 
the location and presence of Coast Guard capabilities in the High North.  Further, and Ice-
classed all-year emergency support vessel could have made an interesting topic in a thesis. 
Increasing expeditions and continuous high fishery activity in the Barents Sea could have 
been explored in connection with helicopter SAR capabilities in Troms county. The MIRG 
team is trained to fight ship fires at sea in the high north. The team is located in Troms 
County, but since SAR helicopters today have to be mobilised from Banak or Bodø an 
emergency efficiency study including these factors would make an interesting research topic. 
Also, the preparedness situation with the re-location of the Bell- helicopters and the delay of 
the Coast Guard`s scheduled NH- 90 helicopters could have been explored in a thesis. 
With the contextual limitations done, this paper seeks to answer the essential questions 
surrounding expedition cruise activity and helicopter resources available in the high north. 
 
1.5 The thesis structure 
The paper offers in its introduction a description of the research, with an analytical model 
presenting the various variables affecting the case study of Norwegian Search and Rescue 
helicopter coverage in the Arctic. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework for the 
thesis. This chapter also presents explanations of key terms such as emergency response 
logistics, mass evacuations and arctic governance. Further, the chapter outlines relevant 
existing studies and theories for the area of research concerning maritime emergencies in the 
High North and emergency response logistics. Chapter 3 deals with methodology and outlines 
the phases of the qualitative study and how the coding of the data material has been structured 
and categorised. Chapter 4 consists of relevant empirical data accessed during the research, 
including existing reports from relevant studies and the context and procedural foundation for 
the work done by Norwegian SAR services in addition to relevant interview data connected to 
the reports. Chapter 5 focuses on analysis and findings developed through the research 
process are discussed in view of the literature presented in the preceding chapters. 
Conclusions are presented in Chapter 6, with concluding remarks on the thesis’s main- and 
sub questions. Chapter 7 offers recommendations for future research. 
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2.0 Theoretical Framework 
In this study, the focus is on the theories relevant to emergency resource – related logistical 
challenges in connection with helicopter evacuations of ship accidents in Arctic waters which 
necessitate a mass evacuation. Emergency response logistics as a concept is a new field of 
research in the emergency response literature and does not yet have an international research 
environment established.  
 
2.1 The crisis concept and emergency planning 
Some social scientists have argued that crises are social constructions (Mcbeth et al., 2013) A 
crisis has various definitions and the concept of a crisis is used in most parts of our society.  
According to Rosenthal et al., a crisis can be understood as: 
`Periods of upheaval and collective stress, disturbing everyday patterns and threatening core 
values and structures in unexpected, often unconceivable, ways`  
Further, crises `represent a serious threat to the basic structure or the fundamental values and 
norms of a system, which under time pressures and highly uncertain circumstances 
necessitates making critical decisions` (Rosenthal et al., 1989:10)  
In this research we focus on crises related to societal disasters and emergency management. 
Barry Turner discusses in his research how we as a society and as organisations are 
influenced by intentions, beliefs and assumptions about the world and hazards in the activities 
we do, and further how we develop norms to avoid hazards (Weick, 1998). A High Reliability 
Organization (HRO) is characterized by its ability to exist in an hazardous environment where 
the consequences of an error are high, but the rate of error occurrence  is extremely low 
(Baker et al., 2006) The HRO principle may be applied to major maritime operators, as they 
do have several measures to apply,  both as prevention and if contingency action is necessary. 
However, they may still be affected by factors beyond their control, such as weather and sea 
mapping reliability in rural waters. 
According to Coppola (2015), there are no common guidelines on how the world`s countries 
develop their disaster management capacities. Modern disaster management, in terms of the 
emergence of global standards and organised efforts to address preparedness, mitigation, and 
response activities for a wide range of disasters, did not emerge until the mid- twentieth 
century (ibid., 2015). During this period, the government’s role in society became more 
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evident in the prevention of and response to disasters. The background for the government`s 
increased involvement with prevention and response in terms of civil defence was warfare 
technology. The regulations and agreements then made to enhance civil defence were the 
foundation of modern disaster and emergency management as we know it today (ibid., 2015).                          
 
When discussing crisis management, emergency or contingency planning is done to develop 
general and specific measures to prevent and prepare organisation for a rare event (Hafting, 
2017:25). 
Emergency planning is an important element in crisis management even though the 
management or co-workers cannot anticipate all undesirable events (Hafting, 2017, 
Hammervoll, 2014). Social science provides insights into human society and individual 
relationships (Canton, 2007) Social scientists attempt to decide why something happens. If we 
take this concept further, it is possible to predict what can occur in the future. Emergency 
planning can be based on realistic possibilities (Canton, 2007:35).  
Logistical concepts and terminologies become more present in emergency planning. 
According to Brachner and Hvattum (2016), preparedness is driven only by response time. 
Preparedness planning can also be extended to include response capacity and studies show 
that the rescue capacity available can be more effective when both operation and emergency 
planning are done. The planning of both preparedness and response capacity opens for a more 
effective use of the emergency resources available (ibid.,2016)  
 
In a crisis situation,  there will always be multiple actors involved and collaborations will 
likely be the factor uniting organisations in their work (Richey, 2009)  Collaboration means 
that more than one unit have responsibility for `exchanging common planning, management, 
execution and performance measurement information` (ibid., 2009:623). A crisis also calls for 
effective communication and understanding of the norms applicable to communication 
exchange. Further, communication formalities and correct frequencies of communication aids 
can be of great importance during crises. Contingency is based on the assumption that things 
continuously change. Contingency planning in the pyramid can further be influenced by firms 
or actors simultaneously seeking different, and conflicting strategies this define their position 
in the supply chain (ibid., 2009) 
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2.2 Emergency response logistics 
Emergency response operations are performed by both public and private actors that are part 
of complex emergency response networks. The actors are part of an organisation consisting of 
humans, a social system working on specific tasks such as SAR (Search and Rescue) at sea, 
supervision or other value- adding activities that are vital for emergency response operations 
(Hammervoll, 2014) 
Emergency response logistics can be defined as the `Activation (and re-activation) of 
emergency resources and cooperation between contingency actors at an undesirable event` 
(Hammervoll, 2014:17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   Time 
            
    Activation                                          Accident site                                Re-activation  
    Figure 2: Emergency Logistics Hammervoll (2014)   
 
 
Emergency response logistics calls for cooperation, exchange of information and planning 
between actors dealing with preparedness. Emergency response logistics is about this 
process,when it comes to activation and re-activation of emergency resources and the use of 
the emergency resources  at the site 
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Emergency logistics can according to Jiang and Yuan (2019) be considered as a very complex 
dynamic process consisting of many co-dependent tasks with complex purposes and 
limitations. E.g. after a large-scale disaster, the primary mission is assembling and allocating 
emergency resources to the affected areas. Research on emergency logistics is still in its early 
stages.  The challenges characteristic for the emergency logistics are shown in the below 
table. 
 
 
Table 1: Challenges for Emergency Logistics (ibid.,2019:4) 
 
Borch (2016) further explains that `Emergency response logistics consists of planning, 
facilitating and implementing of production, storage and transport to secure the flow of 
resources connected to an action in order to reduce the consequences of an undesired event` 
(Borch, 2016) 
Important commonalities when discussing emergency response logistics is further that ; 
The situation is to in a large degree a matter of life and death 
Rapid action saves lives and values 
Time of notification, mobilisation, preparation, consignment of resources and return of 
injured are critical 
Those responsible for the logistics have a great responsibility  
(ibid., 2016) 
 
According to Borch (2016), emergency response logistics (ERL) are further characterised by 
the following key features: 
1) Risk of injury to emergency personnel  
2) Transportation should be effectuated rapidly 
3) Demanding transport of advanced personnel and equipment 
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4) Emergency site may lack infrastructure 
5) Materials and personnel are activated from specific units or bases 
6) High demand for coordination 
7) A specific type of organisation is responsible for transport 
8) Operational standards and procedures are followed 
9) Operations are characterized by uncertainty of what to expect at the accident site 
10) Need for improvisation 
11) The need for transportation may be prolonged 
12) Return transport from site with injured and deceased  
  
When discussing the Arctic region, natural conditions such as major sea areas, harsh weather, 
lack of daylight and icing are factors influencing ERL. Further, great distances, lack of 
infrastructure and international security sensitivity are to be taken into account during 
response to incidents in the region (Borch, 2016) 
Emergency response logistics consists of various phases (ibid.2016):  
 
 
Phases in Emergency response logistics 
Preparation phase Action- phase Revitalisation phase 
1) Purchase  1) Notification 1) Evaluation and revision 
2) Inbound transport to 
storage/ base 
2) Mobilisation of 
equipment and personnel 
2) Maintenance and 
revitalisation of personnel 
and equipment 
3) Storage management / 
base administration 
3) Outbound transport to 
accident site 
 
 4) Establishing and 
management of front base / 
storage 
5) Supply of equipment and 
personnel to accident site 
6) Transport of victims 
7) Exchange and re- 
activation of equipment and 
personnel to base 
8) Re-activation and de-
mobilization 
 
Table 2: Phases in emergency response logistics 
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2.3 Offshore logistics management 
Borch (2016) lists some operational factors influencing offshore logistics management that 
can be related to maritime activities such as those outlined in this paper, taking place in the 
High Arctic, where the location of nearby resources may be coincidental. These factors 
include the type of field the operation is taking place in, and whether it is situated close to 
other fields or shores, and if there is a lack of infrastructure or the possibility of a joint- 
operation is not present. Additionally, the organisation of the unit or company will influence 
logistics management. Distance to available shore resources, the capacity and function of the 
bases and lastly the weather and climate will impact the management of the operation (ibid., 
2016)  
 
 
2.4 Mass Rescue Operations 
Any major ship accident involving several hundred persons on board and possibly resulting in 
loss of the vessel, necessitates a mass rescue operation. According to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), an incident triggering a mass rescue evacuation can be defined 
as `an immediate response to a large number of persons in distress so that the capabilities 
normally available for search and rescue authorities are inadequate` (Andreassen 
et.al,2018:361)Further, a mass evacuation will include the necessity an effective response. 
This implies the need for an `immediate, well planned and closely coordinated large-scale 
action and the use of resources from multiple organizations` (Andreassen et al., 2018:361). 
Further, in the event of a mass evacuation there is crucial need for information about the 
scale, complexity and rarity of the emergency situation (Andreassen et al.,2018, Jardine-
Smith, 2015). In a major maritime SAR operation, the number of people on board, vessel size, 
available emergency resources and rarity of the event must be assessed. This will influence 
the success of the SAR operation, which include several stages such as distress message and 
allocation of information, planning, operation and rescue (Andreassen et al., 2018).   
Borch et al. (2016), describes the scarcity of emergency resources and the increased maritime 
activity level in the Arctic. The limited capacity of emergency resources, faulty 
communication lines and other aspects such as challenging operational conditions are factors 
that put greater demands on SAR operations including mass rescue operation in Arctic waters. 
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2.5 Cold disaster risk governance 
Disaster theory often focuses on disasters occurring in populated and warm climate areas. As 
human activity in the Arctic and Antarctica has become more increasingly common, attention 
must be paid to cold climate disasters (Lauta et al., 2018). 
The Press- and Release model (PAR model) outlines the relationship between factors that 
give rise to `unsafe conditions' (e.g. exposure) (Weichselgartner, 2001). The PAR model 
views disasters in terms of levels of vulnerability and a disaster is not only caused by a natural 
event, but also the surrounding social, political and economic environment (Lauta et.al, 2018). 
When discussing the Arctic region, one can claim that the vulnerability in a cold context is 
caused by absence of, or distance to infrastructure. (Lauda et al., 2018) Arctic governance 
system`s is according to Oren Young dependent on the relevant biophysical and 
socioeconomic features. In an Arctic context, the extreme weather, large distances, small 
population, limited infrastructures and the complexity of the institutional and political 
landscape both work together and against each other in a `cold disaster` The Arctic region has 
various climatic and political features which distinguish it from the rest of the world, calling 
for cold disaster risk governance. When discussing Arctic governance in relation to cold 
disasters, there are amongst others two factors that characteristic for the region that need to be 
considered (Lauta et al. 2018): 
1. Adaption with limited resources. The emergency response framework would improve 
vastly if more investments were made to infrastructure and equipment. Adaption of 
those resources available, organizations and regulations are necessary  
2. Improvisation. Time is essential in an emergency, but especially crucial in cold 
climates. Limited resources call for improvisation during a crisis response. 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter we have examined how the concept of emergency response logistics is 
concentrated around the interaction, activation and re-activation of emergency resources at an 
accident site and is influenced by a number of stressors, particularly in the Arctic region. The 
chapter further explored more specific theories affecting offshore logistics challenges in an 
emergency response operation. Further, mass evacuation is described as a situation where the 
need for information about the complexity and scale of the crisis is needed. A mass 
evacuation further calls for immediate action and normal search and rescue capacities become 
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inadequate. Performing a rapid and effective response is crucial during a mass rescue, 
implying the need for well-planned and closely coordinated large - scale action from multiple 
actors. The PAR model expresses how the social, political and economic environments 
contribute to disasters. Young claims that the effectiveness of Arctic governance is dependent 
on relevant biophysical and socioeconomic features. The concept of disaster risk governance 
further highlights the absence of infrastructure. This calls for adaption of resources, 
improvisation, upscaling of organisations and negotiation to reach flexible arrangements 
during a cold disaster.  
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3.0 Methodology 
In this part of the paper a closer description of the research design is introduced. The 
methodology chapter presents the methods used for data collection including document 
studies, interviews and field visits. Several methods were used in order to answer the research 
topic in the best possible way.  
In research, it is common to divide between a quantitative and qualitative approach. These are 
two different paradigms, or methods. Quantitative research is characterised by findings you 
can measure from a large number of respondents. Qualitative research is characterised by 
sensitivity to the context in which the research studies are conducted (Tjora, 2017). A 
qualitative method often places the researcher close to the object or the situation being 
interviewed or observed. This sense of closeness to the research object create an exciting and 
explorative method of research. The researcher should however be aware of that the ideas and 
presumptions held before conducting an interview or observation may need to be adjusted as 
circumstances may be different to what they expected. As a result of this, the data collection 
can advantageously be performed in the early stages of a research project. This enables the 
researcher to adjust both theory and perspective to the empirical analysis (Tjora, 2017).  
Qualitative research includes several methods, such as analysis of documents, interviews, 
various observations and field work, and auto-ethnographic methods. This paper is mainly 
written using qualitative research based on interviews, observations and documents studies. 
The advantage of selecting interviews and a qualitative approach to the problem in focus is 
that the research gains in-depth knowledge of the problem in focus. The disadvantage is that 
the number of informants is limited in qualitative studies, and generalisability is thus not 
possible in the same way with a quantitative approach using for instance a questionnaire sent 
by e-mail, which acquire data from a large number of respondents. Some quantitative 
technical data material also contributes as a foundation to the paper`s analysis chapter, but the 
case study has a qualitative approach. A qualitative approach will limit the number of 
informants, but as a single case study is the basis of this paper, it is considered that gaining in-
depth knowledge and information from interviews is the most advantageous approach to the 
problem in focus. 
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3.1 Research Design  
This thesis can best be labelled as a single-case study, characterised by being limited by the 
case`s environment, phenomenon, type of informants or perspectives and theories` (Tjora, 
2017:24).  Further, the approach to this study can be described as inductive. An inductive 
approach is used in research that is explorative and / or is driven by evidence. An inductive 
method can further be used to conclude a general rule from one or more single cases which 
can then be applied to your research. (Tjora, 2017:259).  
 
3.2 Data generating process  
As an alternative to the term `data collection`, the term `data generating process` is used to 
signal that empirical data does not exist `out there` but is rather constructed through the 
research itself. Tjora (2017:256) Agreements, reports and other written documentation from 
several sources forms the contextual data material used in this this paper. In addition, 
information from interviews and observations from field visits to SAR actors were used to 
generate data. Semi-structured interviews were the main data generating source in addition to 
written documentation. The research subject in this paper consists of three sub-questions with 
the scope to reveal the situation concerning available emergency resources and the emergency 
response logistic required to respond to a ship distress call at 80 north. It also raises 
questions about the special conditions in the High North that may be challenging compared 
with a similar ship distress call closer to the mainland. Reports and agreements contribute to 
creating an overview of the current emergency response logistics situation. Through 
interviews, we are able to `study opinions, attitudes and experience` (Tjora, 2017:114).  These 
two combined methods in the qualitative research field can contribute to answering the 
research queries in this paper. The data material collected during the research process and 
from the interviews was sorted and relevant data were selected for use. The subsequent 
research then included what can be described as an open-code generating process (Nilssen, 
2014) , which involved categorising of the data material using what Tjora (2017) described as 
a stepwise-deductive- inductive method. This method aims to develop raw material in various 
stages, in this case notes and audio files later transcribed into text, into concepts or theories 
(Tjora, 2017:18). The approach can be described as one driven by inductive empiri, though 
this does not, according to Tjora (2017) lessen the importance of theory.  
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3.2.1 Document study 
Document studies can be used in a wide range of research- topics. Often, they focus on the 
development of a topic within a given period, which enables us to identify changes or stability 
within a research area (Brinkmann & Tanggard, 2012). During the writing process it was 
necessary to study several agreements, regulations, handbooks and articles on research done 
on the topic.  Several of the research documents and articles were published very recent, as 
they focus on the increased maritime traffic in the high north that has developed over the last 
few years. It was clear that due to the nature of the Arctic in combination with a new, 
commercial cruise market developing over the last few years, the study needed to take into 
account new research papers that have considered the possibility for of major ship disaster 
necessitating a mass evacuation. 
 
3.2.2 Interviews 
The reason we interview people is to `gain knowledge of human experiences from their 
approach` (Brinkmann & Tanggard, 2012:19). From my study supervisor, I received advice 
on possible informants to contact in the North of Norway and Svalbard. These individuals 
were contacted with an informative e-mail, followed up by an appointment for an interview. 
Most interviews were conducted at the informants` work location. An interview gives the 
researcher an `opportunity to concentrate on how people experience events, situations or 
phenomena in their own lives. (ibid., 2012: 20). 
 
3.2.3 In- depth interviews 
The interviews were conducted with a total of nine informants representing Norwegian actors 
working in areas concerning search and rescue. One of the interviews was done by phone, one 
by video call and one by e-mail while the remaining were conducted while visiting their work 
location. After the interview details were agreed upon, interview guides adapted to the 
informants` work and the research topic of the study were developed. The interview guides is 
found in appendix 4 of this thesis. Some information in the interview guides has been 
censored to protect the informants identity. The interviews were initially designed to be 
focused, with the questions being limited to factors relevant to the research questions. 
However, already during the first interview, it was apparent that a description somewhere 
between in-depth and focused interviews was the most appropriate. This is possibly partly due 
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to the complexity of the study, but also the fact that the interviews were conducted during 
visits to the informants` place of work. It was natural to be shown around their workplace 
before or after the interview were conduction. The experience of being able to observe was 
very useful, and frequently matters that were relevant and unexpected came up for discussion 
during the tour. Notes were taken during this phase of the visits.  During the interviews, audio 
taping was used for later transcription. As audio taping was done during the research process, 
the projects had to be notified to Data Protection Services (NSD). The assessment of the study 
received from NSD stated that there was a low personal data risk. The information letter sent 
to the informants based on this assessment, is included in appendix III of this paper. 
Since all the interviews were conducted in Norwegian, while the thesis is written in English, 
some context may have been lost during the translation of the transcribed material. All the 
interview situations were experienced as relaxed yet still involved a high level of engagement 
from the informants regarding the current SAR situation. The informants spoke openly during 
the interview situations, and possibly due to a common interest for concern about these 
matters in the High North, it was easy to establish an informal surrounding without any effort, 
which Tjora (2017) highlights as one of the prerequisites for succeeding with an interview 
situation. 
Role Entity Code 
Management  SAR Actor INF 01 
Operational SAR Actor INF 02 
Operational  SAR Actor INF 03 
Representative  SAR Actor INF 04 
Management  SAR Actor INF 05 
Management  SAR Actor INF 06 
Operational  SAR Actor INF 07 
Operational  SAR Actor INF 08 
Management  SAR Actor INF 09 
Table 3: List of informants 
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3.2.4 Field visits and observation 
Field visits are a method used to gather knowledge, where the researcher observes the group 
or setting that is being studied (Brinkmann & Tanggard, 2012: 46). Based on the interview-
requests sent to the potential informants, it was agreed that the interviews would take place at 
the various informants` places of work. The visits and observations done in connection with 
the interviews, gave the researcher unexpected, but very useful input. To observe where the 
actual SAR- operations are planned and effectuated and to be able to gain knowledge of how 
the informants work was a very valuable addition to the research. During these observations 
and visits written notes were taken.  The research cannot be described as a field study or 
observational studys, as the interview was still the core method used. However, based on 
these visits and observations, the foundation of the research paper was strengthened and 
experiencing and viewing the work in action was a valuable addition to this thesis. 
 
3.2.5 Phone interviews  
All except three informants were interviewed in person during visits to their place of work. A 
planned in-depth interview with one of the informants at their workplace had to be re-
scheduled as a video interview due to unforeseen events. Another informant was not listed on 
the list of informants, but during a phone call made to gain access to another informant, a 
spontaneous interview was held. This informant had much background information about the 
search and rescue helicopter situation in Norway to offer, and the notes made during the 
phone interview led to more research in this area and information gained from this interview 
and the subsequent further research forms part of this paper. According to Brinkmann and 
Tanggard (2012:170), `a phone interview may lead to uncertainty of who the person in the 
other end are`. The conversation started with both the interviewer and the informant 
presenting themselves and it was established that they had several common areas of interest, 
and a light and informal tone was established. The informant then asked if he could contribute 
with insight, which was very welcome. Notes were taken during the interview, contributing 
with valuable information that led to additional research.   
 
3.3 Transcription of audio taped interviews 
Audit taping were done in two of the interviews and transcribed fully. During the transcribing, 
there was a focus on follow Tjora`s (2017:174) advices to notice details, such as if the 
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informants paused, and were looking to find words, as this may indicate that the informant is 
uncertain when answering. One of the challenges that arises during transcribing, is that `visual 
cues` recorded in the interview are lost while transcribing the interview into written words 
(Tjora, 2017:175). Another challenge was that the transcribed notes were translated into 
English, so much time spent on finding the most appropriate translations of valuable quotes 
and information so that important information was preserved in the thesis. 
 
3.4 Validity, reliability and generalizability 
The quality of a qualitative research study can be assessed in terms of the study’s `validity, 
reliability and generalisability (Leung, 2015:325)  
 
3.4.1 Validity 
According to Leung (2015), validity in qualitative research can be described as the 
`appropriateness` of the tools, processes, and data. (Leung, 2015:325). To produce valid 
research, the researcher seeks to verify whether the research questions have been answered 
and are valid for the research. Further, to establish if the methodology chosen is suitable for 
answering the questions and the design, data collection, analysis and results and conclusions 
are valid (ibid.:325). A combination of analysis of document studies and interviews seeking to 
answer the research questions and sub- questions concerning helicopter capacities, practical 
operational challenges, questions concerning helicopter base locations, response time and 
mass evacuation using a stepwise deductive inductive method (SDI) have been used to code 
and categorise information, providing material for answers to the questions raised by the 
study. Tjora (2017:232) describes validity as being connected to the question of whether the 
responses we find in our research are the answers to what we seek to answer.  We can 
strengthen the validity of a study by clarifying how we practice research based on the 
questions asked and how these questions are designed, with the foundation being what we 
seek to explore and established research in the field of study. The current study coheres with 
newer articles and research in the field. The term emergency response logistics` is an 
innovative term. Combined with a large increase in exploration cruise activities in the High 
Arctic during recent years, relevant articles of newer dates have been studied. Exploring this 
material has resulted in consistency between this study and other available research in the 
field. 
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3.4.2 Reliability 
While in a quantitative research paper reliability refers to the replicability of the research 
processes and results, `the essence of reliability for qualitative studies lies with the 
consistency`(Leung, 2015: 326), Tjora (2017) describes reliability as whether we are able to 
determine a connection between the empirical data, analysis and results of a study. The 
connection between these must not be influenced by personal, political or other unknown 
factors. Reliability can be summarised as whether if any other researcher conducted the same 
study as this thesis represents, within the same time frame and surroundings available, the 
results of the study would be similar. 
 
3.4.3 Generalizability  
In most qualitative research, the researcher `aims to study a specific issue or phenomenon 
within a context` (Leung, 2015:326) Generalisability is not expected. Due to the increased 
knowledge offered by qualitative research studies, evaluation of generalisability becomes 
relevant (ibid.,:326). Leung (2015) further argues that a pragmatic approach to assessing 
generalisability for a qualitative study is to use the same criteria used to assess validity. Tjora 
(2017) discusses the term `conceptual generalisability`. This form of generalisability is 
connected to the stepwise-deductive-inductive method, seeking to present findings as 
concepts such as typology, terms and metaphors not necessarily connected to the empirical 
data foundation or the case of the study. Using this form of generalisability, makes the 
researcher aware of factors that complement the empirical data by asking questions. Such 
questions can be whether there are central features with the observations and findings done, 
and if there are any dimensions in the data that can be used to outline variations in the data 
collected (Tjora, 2015:246) 
 
3.4.4 Transparency  
In any methodological research, a large degree of transparency is considered `positive for the 
quality of the study`(Tjora, 2017:266). During the writing of this thesis, there has been a focus 
on taking notes not only as a form of data collection, but also on the settings and surroundings 
of the study, trying to establish a commonality and atmosphere for the field of study. This 
contributes to better communicating how things were done and what considerations were 
made in this study, such as when choosing informants and processing the collected data. As 
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for transparency about the research subjects, the study attempts to highlight the unique 
characteristics of operating in Arctic waters as well as the continuous changes occurring due 
to increased cruise activity and the questions arising about the current situation and demand 
for emergency response resources in the event of a mass evacuation situation in the High 
North. During the coding of the data material the study has focused on identifying cues 
indicating important findings, so that this thesis will be as relevant and comprehensive as 
possible.  The main goal of this thesis is to provide insight into the rescue helicopter 
emergency response situation in the event of a maritime cruise accident in the High North. To 
present this insight expediently, transparency is of utmost importance. To convey the study`s 
insights and findings, some quotations from the interviews have been included in the paper, 
aiming to give readers the opportunity to get  `closer to the empirical data` as Tjora 
(2015:249) suggests, and not only through the writer of this paper’s perspective. The 
quotations used in this study can be traced to the list of informants and are included in the 
paper in order to support the conceptual meaning rather than to serve an anecdote 
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4.0 Empirical Data 
In this chapter the empirical findings from the qualitative research are presented, aiming to 
answer the problem in focus in this thesis. The chapter outline how the Norwegian Search and 
Rescue services are organised with a focus on notifications of emergencies, principles applied 
in rescue operations and guidelines for relevant SAR operations. Further, the context of 
emergency readiness in the Arctic is outlined, such as common projects aiming to improve 
search and rescue in the high north. The chapter further focuses on the variables considered in 
the thesis research question, aiming to provide insight and information from both empirical 
documents and interviews: 
Emergency response logistics in the High Arctic - What is the relation between expedition 
cruise activity and helicopter capabilities in the meaning of a) location and b) helicopter type 
for mass evacuation in the Norwegian High Arctic?   
Sub-question 1: 
What evacuation capacities are required in terms of response time and the number of persons 
needing evacuation on board an expedition cruise ship in the Norwegian High North?    
Sub-question 2   
In which areas is there a need for rescue helicopter coverage in case a ship evacuation is 
necessary? Increasing cruise and maritime transport activities in Arctic waters continue to 
expand Norway` s area of SAR response responsibilities  
Sub-question 3  
How do contextual factors such as weather and distance to hospitals influence evacuation 
capacity needs? How do evacuation capacity needs influence helicopter capabilities in the 
terms of a) helicopter SAR capacity and b) location?   
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4.1 Helicopter base location 
The helicopter SAR bases in Norway include resources with a total of 13 active SAR 
helicopter units with maximum 1 hour readiness. These helicopters have long range 
capacities.   
Norwegian Rescue Helicopter Resources located by SAR Bases as per March 2019: 
Base/ Location Helicopter  No. of 
aircrafts 
Operator Replacement 
with AW101-612 
Scheduled: 
Longyearbyen  Airbus AS332 L1 
Super Puma 
2 Lufttransport FW No 
Rygge Westland Sea King 
MK43B 
2 No.330 Squadron 
RNoAF 
Yes 
Sola Westland Sea King 
MK43B 
2 No.330 Squadron 
RNoAF 
Yes 
Florø Airbus AS332 L1 
Super Puma 
1 CHC Helicopter 
Service 
Yes 
Ørlandet Westland Sea King 
MB43B 
2 No.330 Squadron 
RNoAF 
Yes 
Bodø Westland Sea King 
MB43B 
2 No.330 Squadron 
RNoAF 
Yes 
Banak Westland Sea King 
MB43B 
2 No.330 Squadron 
RNoAF 
Yes 
Table 4: Norwegian SAR Helicopter Base Locations (Luftambulanse, 2019) 
 
In addition, helicopters with SAR capacities are located at the Ekofisk, Statfjord B, 
Osebergand and Heidrun oilfields. Additional SAR helicopters are placed in Sola, 
Hammerfest and Vardø. All these are privately operated aircrafts installed to support the oil- 
and gas industry (SAR Cooperation Plan, 2019)  
Light air ambulance helicopters with 15 minutes readiness carrying medical personnel 
onboard are located at hospitals at bases in Oslo/ Lørenskog, Arendal, Stavanger, Bergen, 
Førde, Trondheim, Brønnøysund , Evenes and Tromsø. These helicopters do not have long- 
range capacities and do not normally not operate beyond the Norwegian Coast line (SAR 
Cooperation Plan, 2019) 
Norway purchased a total of 14 multi role military helicopters, NHIndustries NH-90, 
scheduled to be delivered between 2005 and 2008. Six of the NH-90 helicopters will be 
dedicated to the Royal Norwegian Navy, while eight of the helicopters will serve in 
Norwegian Coast Guard duties. A total of eight helicopters have been delivered. However, six 
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of these are only used for training purposes. Due to insufficient delivery and flight hour 
completion, the phasing of this project will likely not be completed before 2022 
(Riksrevisjonen, 2018-2019).  The NH-90 bases are located at the 337 Squadron in Bardufoss, 
Troms. The other operative base for this aircraft will be in Haakonsvern, Bergen (Norwegian 
Armed Forces a, 2019) The NH- 90 helicopters can contribute to search and rescue missions 
(Norwegian Armed Forces b, 2019) 
To maintain and improve Norwegian SAR- resources, the Norwegian government has 
purchased 16 AW101 helicopters for bases located in the mainland of Norway. The project is 
described as the Norwegian All Weather Search and Rescue Helicopters (NAWSARH), 
(Aarseth, 2014). The AW101 helicopters will replace the current Sea King helicopters and 
operate within a multi-use concept within search and rescue, ambulance missions and police 
assistance with locations at six different main coast bases in Norway; Rygge, Sola, Florø, 
Ørlandet, Bodø and Banak. The project includes delivery of spare parts, equipment and 
training packages. The Norwegian Parliament`s Proposition 146 S (2010-2011), which deals 
with the acquisition of the new rescue helicopters, entails an option of the purchase of 
additional AW101s that can contribute to strengthen the Norwegian Emergency preparedness 
in Arctic regions with future new bases in Northern Norway and strengthening the response 
capabilities. Before being implemented, this option must be submitted to the Norwegian 
Parliament. One of the research questions raised in this paper is whether the Arctic waters will 
be strengthened by NAWSARH helicopter base placement in Troms and the possible future 
contribution to the SAR helicopter base in Longyearbyen. 
 
4.2 Helicopter type 
One of the main characteristics of the NAWSARH helicopters is that capacities are improved 
and strengthened for all features compared to the Sea King helicopters covering the 
Norwegian mainland bases today.  The NAWSARH is especially designed for operation in 
Arctic conditions.  
The figure below illustrates a comparison of the NAWSARH AW101 and the Sea King 
helicopters, currently operating on the mainland. 
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Figure 4: NAWSARH illustration (NAWSARH project) 
According to informants, replacing the Sea King helicopters with the AW101s will  
`represent a capacity improvement what helicopter range, speed and number of rescued 
people in one helicopter unit concerns` (INF 02, INF 03), 
Further the AW101 will, according to informants (INF 02, INF 03) give the mission better 
margins and the de-icing feature is an important supplement compared to the Sea King when 
operating in the High Arctic. 
It had been publicly discussed whether the AW101 NAWSARH could be a replacement for 
the two AS332L1 AWSARs on Svalbard. Norway has an existing option opening up for the 
purchase of additional helicopters before 2022. As Svalbard is regulated by the Svalbard 
Treaty, there might be implications arising if the Norwegian 330 Squadron is to operate the 
helicopters as according to the Treaty, there shall be no permanent military presence on 
Svalbard one of the informants stated. This thesis does not, however, discuss these 
implications to any great extent. Informants located on Svalbard or working close to Svalbard 
uphold that there is a great focus on preparedness and that the services provided when it 
comes to SAR helicopters are good and according to one informant, “well adapted”. The 
current two helicopters have an uptime of 99,31 % (SAR 1) and 89,62 % (SAR 2).  
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4.3 Response time and the number of people needing evacuation 
All ships are equipped with life-saving equipment such as lifeboats, rafts and personal life 
vests. The trawler grounding in Hinlopen in December 2018 also had other regulations to 
comply with than a larger expedition cruise ship. A fishing vessel will have survival suits for 
all those on board, helping to keep them dry and warm, while this is not common on larger 
ships, where life vests are the standard personal survival equipment. The time factor will be of 
outmost importance in case of an incident necessitating a mass evacuation from an expedition 
cruise ship in a cold climate. In Longyearbyen, two SAR helicopters are stationed, and 
according to the agreement made with Norwegian Authorities for rescue helicopter services, 
the first helicopter, `SAR 1` should be mobilised within one hour and the second, `SAR 2` 
within two hours. One of the informants stated that: 
`When the alarm goes off, it is never more that 35- 37 minutes before you are in the air`   
(INF 07) 
When it comes to mobilising SAR helicopters from the mainland to assist north of Svalbard, 
informants expressed that this would take 9-12 hours depending on the base location. 
To evacuate 400 passengers from 80 North and transport them back to Longyearbyen is not 
an option, according to several informants. It would be necessary to gather situational 
awareness and find a landing- point where passengers and crew can stay temporarily until 
further salvage arrives one informant claimed. Such a temporary stay has been discussed with 
informants, and both a temporary base on land or a base on a larger ship could be an option. 
There are existing resources on Svalbard that can drop so- called survivor-kits helping the 
survivors during the first critical hours until they are transported to areas with infrastructure.   
During hoisting of survivors from the ship, both visibility and wave height influence the 
operation. Informants told that one hoisting takes from 1-2 minutes. Weather conditions may 
affect the operation and pose more challenges to the time used on hoisting.  If those on board 
have more serious injuries, the hoisting will be more challenging and take far more time: 
`A hoist operation becomes more complicated with a stretcher; it takes much longer` (INF 07) 
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4.4. Rescue helicopter coverage in case of a ship evacuation 
The dedicated SAR helicopters are today located in six mainland bases and in Longyearbyen. 
The Sea Kings on the mainland bases are scheduled to be replaced by the new AW101 
NAWSARH helicopters. To assist with a mass-evacuation far north of Svalbard and cover 
Norwegian SAR area responsibility up to 80 north use of fueling oportunities are necessary.  
In the event of the trawler grounding in Hinlopen in late 2018, around 104 nm from 
Longyearbyen, two helicopters were sent, according to one informant, as the initial 
notification stated that the crew of 14 had abandoned the ship and were in the sea. The second 
helicopter continued after having been noticed that the crew was still onboard, in order to 
locate a cabin that could be used as temporary shelter for survivors if necessary. One 
informant stated that there would have been no problem carrying all the passengers in one 
helicopter. `There is always a plan`, one of the informants told, and the decision to use two 
helicopters was taken by the fatigue manager to reduce the time for the first unit above the 
ship in hoisting position. 
This event show that event though this operation was very successful, a scenario involving 
400 passengers will require far more than two helicopters in operation. The SAR  helicopters 
in Longyearbyen have, accoording to one informant,  the posibility to use the fuel depot on 
Storøya to reach 35 East in the SAR area. Statistics and development in the exploration 
cruise ship market calls for preparedness. One informant expressed that there is a need for 
bigger helicopters with longer range in Longyearbyen, while another supported a solution 
with a third similar helicopter at the Svalbard base set up for long range. A base located in 
Troms, would according to all informants strenghten the preparedness if helicopters from the 
mainland bases are to be mobilised north of Svalbard in case of a ship evacuation. 
 
4.5 Contextual factors 
Factors that are characteristic for the Arctic compared to the rest of the world, are very 
important when considering the emergency preparedness. One of the challenges connected to 
operating in the High Arctic region, is that the communication can pose a challenge. 
According to one informant, this was the biggest challenge with the Northguider grounding in 
Hinlopen: 
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`They transmitted blindly, and did not get any confirmation that their distress call was 
received` (INF 06) 
The rescuers were therefore concerned that the crew had abandoned the vessel and was in the 
sea, in which they would have been faced with a whole different scenario. 
Luckily, the informant further explained, they had done everything right. They were wearing 
survival suits, and the captain brought VHF`s out on deck so they could communicate. 
 
4.5.1 Agreements and regulations 
According to international SAR agreements and regulations, Norway is responsible for a 
substantial search and rescue area in the High Arctic through mutual SAR agreements, as 
illustrated below.  
 
 
Figure 4: Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement Areas of Application 
(Ikkonen, 2017) 
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According to established international rescue conventions for operations connected to sea and 
air (ICAO /IMO), a Search and Rescue operation can be divided into five stages (JRCC II, 
2018). 
      Attention/     First measure    Planning       Operation          End  
      First notice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Stages of a Search- and Rescue Operation (JRCC, 2018) 
In the first stage, notification of an emergency, or possible emergency situation, is given and 
received and of a common situational awareness between the Joint Rescue Coordination 
Centre and emergency services is established (JRCC II, 2018:13). Situational awareness is by 
multiple informants described as a very important factor in the early stages of an emergency 
response operation.  
In the second stage, measures are taken to alert SAR- actors and gather information. If the 
situation is critical, SAR resources may be deployed at this stage (JRCC II, 2018:13) 
The third stage involve the preparation of the SAR operation, including considerations about 
how to to facilitate a mass evacuation, transfer survivors to a safe area and planning of 
receival of survivals in hospitals (JRCC II, 2018:13). 
In stage four emergency resources are activated to the incident site, and coordination and 
completion of search and rescue and evacuation and transfer of the distressed to a safe area or 
hospital are carried out (JRCC, 2018:13). 
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The last stage concludes the Search -and Rescue operation, based on relevant criteria such as 
a successful salvage and evacuation, or the conclusion there is no longer any hope of finding 
survivors. This stage involves the de-activation of emergency resources, the follow- up of 
Next of Kin, debriefing and reporting (JRCC, 2018:13). 
In the second stage, the criticality of the rescue mission is determined. This is done on 
existing information and the criticality of the situation is categorised as one of three levels by 
defined by the Norwegian rescue services: 
Uncertainty. Awareness is established that an incident must be investigated or needs follow-
up, but SAR resources are not yet activated 
Preparedness. The situation may require assistance, but no critical emergency has been 
established. SAR-actors may be alerted at this stage.   
Emergency: An established emergency situation based on either uncertainty about the 
situation in the prior level, or information about persons in an emergency that justifies 
activation of SAR resources. 
(JRCC II, 2018:15) 
4.5.1.1 Levels of crisis management and the supervision of rescue operations 
A rescue operation coordinated by the Norwegian Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) 
is supervised on three levels: 
The tactical level, or the first line of response, describes the rescue efforts and resources at the 
site of emergency. On shore, the tactical level is often coordinated by police departments. At 
sea, an `On Scene Coordinator`, or OSC, may be appointed if the JRCC finds this expedient, 
for instance a person with maritime search and rescue experience on board a ship coordinating 
the rescue efforts between the units involved. In a rescue mission where there is a need to 
coordinate several aircrafts, as a mass evacuation with helicopters will require, an `Air 
Coordinator`, or ACO will be appointed by the JRCC. An ACO may execute duties from both 
shore and air. 
 
The operational level describes the management involved. The management delegates tasks to 
the tactical level in the rescue operation. Operations at sea are led by the JRCC, and the rescue 
officer on duty is the main coordinator of the operation assisted by other rescue officers. 
 
The strategic correspond with the management on an executive level, consisting of the rescue 
leaders in regional police districts and at the two Joint Rescue Coordination Centres. The 
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management operations at the strategic level shall have a long-term perspective on the 
planning in order to successfully manage the emergency. 
4.5.1.2 Notifications of Emergencies  
Norwegian rescue services can be alerted by several means, such as alerts to the national 
emergency services, coastal radio or directly to one of the JRCCs in Sola or Bodø. In the 
event of a maritime emergency, JRCCs may requests for assistance from other Rescue 
Coordination Centres and can receive distress calls from Emergency Position- Indicating 
Beacons. (JRCC I, 2018:66). 
4.5.1.3 SAR- notification 
There are several notifications sent out when an accident occurs, and one of these is described 
as an SAR-notification, where the JRCC is included immediately. Such a notification is used 
when it is evident that rescue services must be involved or when the situation may develop in 
a way which will to necessitate mobilisation of rescue services. An incident as described in 
this case study, with a distress call from a ship located on 80  north of Svalbard calls for a 
SAR-notification. (JRCC I, 2018:67). 
4.5.1.4 Principles applied during a rescue operation 
The established main principle for the Norwegian Rescue Service is a `rapid mobilization of 
enough resources` (JRCC I, 2018:66). A rapid rescue operation is an effective operation if 
extensive notifications are performed and if the consequences of an emergency is limited as a 
result of actions taken. A total of three sub- principles apply during a distress situation. The 
first requires that potential resources are notified as quickly as possible, the second principle 
is to establish sufficient contact with resources and the third is to pre- notify when the 
situation calls for the possibility of a rescue operation, mobilising resources in the direction of 
the emergency and at the same time work on revealing possible threats to the operation, such 
as weather conditions and local circumstances at the incident site. (JRCC, 2018). 
4.5.1.5 Guidelines for a maritime emergency 
The Norwegian Rescue Services is founded on the cooperation between public, private and 
voluntary resources. JRCC has developed and maintained a national guide for planning and 
collaboration in the rescue service (JRCC II, 2018). This guide outlines a number of scenarios 
and specific procedures and guidelines to be applied during an emergency. A ship distress 
event in the High North will require obtaining as much information as possible at an early 
stage in the emergency. The JRCC procedure for a maritime emergency, hereunder a cruise 
ship in distress takes into account possible causes such as grounding, collision, fire, leakage 
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and capsizing. When the first notification is received by the JRCC, the following information 
is requested from the notifying party: 
Situation at the site of emergency 
Position. GPS positioning, distance to shore and direction of the drifting vessel 
Description of the object, such as vessel type and specification, communication and rescue 
equipment on board and options available for evacuating the ship. 
Number of people involved 
Communications means during the operation, such as VHF or EPIRB 
Weather conditions at the site such as wind direction, visibility and sea conditions. 
 
4.5.2 Natural conditions of the Arctic 
Search and Rescue in the High North, SARiNOR, was established as a framework for the 
legally binding SAR-Agreement between the eight Arctic Council members (SARiNOR, 
2019). SARiNORs` working premises include, in addition to environmental protection 
aspects, the relevant legal frames and guidelines concerning the search and rescue of human 
lives in distress in arctic waters. The SARiNOR action plan issued in 2018 was founded on a 
number of research reports and recommendations made by professional advisors and decision 
making bodies such as the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Norwegian Foreign 
and Defense Committee and the Norwegian Justice Committee (SARiNOR, 2018) The Action 
Plan outlined several recommendations to enhance the protection of human lives in Arctic 
waters as the activity and number of people on board increase: 
 
- `The committee believes that the government should consider Longyearbyen as a hub for 
search and rescue in the Arctic`  
-The committee believes it is important to intensify the survey of the waters around Svalbard 
and in this connection refers to SARiNOR.   
-In the light of unpredictable weather and ice conditions, creating a separate weather radar 
on Svalbard should also be considered 
-The committee also emphasises the importance of training and joint exercises in order to 
achieve better interaction between actors who are expected to contribute with search and 
rescue and refer to the SARiNOR project`. (SARiNOR,2018).  
The SARiNOR project seeks to unite the various capacities of commercial actors, operating 
according to minimum requirements set out in international maritime laws and regulations 
and governmental obligations given by Norwegian authorities. In the Norwegian 
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government`s White Paper on the High North (St. 7, 2011-2012 ), it is stated that `The 
Government will ensure Norwegian ability to carry out rescue services in its own and 
adjacent rescue responsibilities through maintaining and improving our ability for effective 
search and rescue`.  Even though commercial actors bear a large responsibility for their 
operations in Arctic waters, the government needs to ensure that national abilities to conduct 
search and rescue operations are in place. The Action Plan asks that the Norwegian 
government consider Longyearbyen in Svalbard as an SAR- hub. This highlights the 
importance of the placement of emergency response resources in the High North. The 
SARiNOR committee concluded their report by stating that `even though Norway already 
support a large scale of SAR resources, the SAR preparedness is not designed to meet the 
increased activity and risk of accidents`. (SARiNOR, 2018:9).  
One of the informants highlighted the importance of the SARiNOR project for the 
development of equipment on board vessels in the High Arctic.  
`There is a knowledge-based approach. You have the first- line preparedness where the ship 
does what it can to keep people alive. Lifeboats, rafts to keep them safe, preferably dry. Once 
you get wet in the Arctic, the survival rate drops drastically.` (INF01) 
The first Marpart report,`Maritime activity in the High North- current and estimated level up 
to 2025`(Borch.et al. 2016a) issued in 2016, highlights that there is an increased commercial 
activity level both in Norwegian waters and Svalbard sea areas; hence maritime activity is 
moving towards areas with severe conditions (ibid.:36). The Norwegian government has 
listed important changes to be made when developing foreign policy in the Arctic region, 
stating that there is a need for closer discussions and cooperation among parties involved in 
activities and multilateral agreements. Further there is a need for more detailed policies, 
understanding of the northern ecosystem, and knowledge and expertise (ibid.:37). 
To enhance and strengthen the emergency preparedness systems and capacities in the High 
North, Norway will focus on the development of research activities, transportation systems 
and sustainable economic growth. Through the project Arctic 2030, investments are planned 
in the region with preparedness and environment as one of the prioritised areas. (ibid.:37, 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
In 2016, the port of Longyearbyen scheduled a total of 36 port calls from 25 different 
passenger and cruise vessels (Borch et al., 2016a). Many of these ships carried far more than 
400 passengers, and in 2019, for instance the MSC Preziosa is expected to arrive with a 
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capacity of carrying a crew of 1370 persons and a maximum passenger capacity of 4345. 
(Port of Longyearbyen, 2019). As for expedition cruise vessels carrying a few hundred 
passengers, one of the informants (INF 05) expressed that there will be an increase in visits to 
Svalbard for over the next few years and that more than 30 new polar class ships will be 
delivered during the next three to four years in this market segment.  
According to the second Marpart project report, Svalbard is distinguished in both natural and 
social senses and represents different challenges for emergency preparedness systems (Borch 
et al., 2016b: 50) and further, the High Arctic condition affect the probabilities of accidents 
occurring given the less developed infrastructure. The report further highlights that the 
preparedness system have similar incidents occurring on the mainland and Svalbard, such as 
injuries and missing people. However, since emergency response capacities available for a 
respond to an accident outside Svalbard are limited, the consequences may be more severe. 
The report further lists possible variations of events occurring at Svalbard in a matrix of 
events visualising types of accidents that may occur at sea. These include events of 
grounding, damages to hull due to collision with sea ice or other obstacles, ship fire, intended 
undesirable events and other events. The risk matrixes calculating consequences connected to 
the events,  show that for human lives, the risk of significant and serious consequences is high 
on tourist ships (ibid.,:70) According to the project report, there are conditions in the High 
Arctic that can affect the likelihood of incidents occurring such as darkness, icing and lack of 
sea mapping. Weather and seasonal changes are further described as `dramatic and difficult to 
foresee` (ibid.:7). The second Marpart report further summarises that there are limited 
capacities concerning the mitigation of consequences of large-scale accidents. As the cruise 
industry in the High Arctic has not established their own SAR and oil spill response capacity 
as the oil industry are obliged to, the authorities must therefore assess the risks more 
thoroughly and consider emergency capacities in areas where cruise ship activities are more 
frequent (ibid.). 
 
4.5.2.1 Joint Arctic exercises to enhance SAR capabilities  
Article 10 of the SAR Agreement between Arctic countries states that the parties shall meet, 
and conduct and review joint exercises and training and based on this review improve 
guidelines and services (Arctic Council, 2011).  
In 2018, the annual Joint Arctic SAR TTX was held in Reykjavik, Iceland. One of the factors 
highlighted by the participants was the importance of time in a SAR operation; `The main 
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challenge will often be related to helicopter range and limitations. Distances are a challenge` 
(Joint Arctic SAR ttx Report, 2018:8) According to Schmied (2016), joint exercises can 
contribute to create experience-based learning. Exercises uniting actors in the Arctic both 
across national borders and areas of competency, can according to Schmied reveal gaps. 
Incidents such as ship distress that requires evacuation, involving a samaritan vessel. Schmied 
(2016) further highlights that joint exercises can contribute to experience-based learning in 
terms of reviewing new standards, regulations and recommendations, for instance the Polar 
Code. Testing of Life Saving Appliances (LSA) also contributes towards such learning. A 
joint exercise can also provide insight by testing potential scenarios.  
The Barents Rescue is an annual exercise held between Norway and Russia to maintain the 
cooperation agreement in the search for missing and rescued people in distress in the Barents 
Sea established in 1954 (by the then the Soviet Union). (JRCC, 2018). The rescue exercises 
are coordinated by the JRCC North Norway and MRCC (Murmansk Rescue Coordination 
Center) and the main national SAR actors contribute during the exercise. 
The SAREX exercises were held in 2016 and 2017, where actors including the Coast Guard, 
industry specialists, governmental organisations and academia participated (Jensen, 2018). 
and Spitzbergen report was issued following a Search and Rescue Exercise which took place 
off North Spitzbergen in 2016. The weather conditions were excellent, and the participants 
were healthy. The report concluded that survival in life rafts and lifeboats is significantly 
reduced after some hours and the exercise was aborted after 24 hours. It was found that if 
survival in polar waters should be for at least five days, such as the Polar Code guidelines 
requires significant modifications to equipment and supplies.(SAREX, 2016). According to 
Jensen (2018), there was a significant gap between performance of SOLAS-approved 
lifesaving and evacuation equipment, and the requirements of the Polar Code. (Jensen, 2018). 
It was further concluded that a mass evacuation would call for improvisation from those 
involved. The report concluded that it was not possible to determine how long survival would 
be possible while waiting to be evacuated by SAR resources in Arctic waters (SAREX, 2016).  
The main goal with the Marpart project is to `assess the risk of the increased maritime activity 
in the High North and the challenges this increase may represent for the preparedness 
institutions in this region`(MARPART I, 2019). The Marpart documents focus on which 
coordination tools and controls should be applied in order to optimize use of resources from a 
number of countries and institutions (MARPART 1, 2019), and investigates the capacity 
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needs for challenges related to Arctic maritime operations such as oil spill recovery, 
firefighting and salvages, undesired destructive events and search and rescue (SAR).  
 
4.5 Fuel depots 
It was not possible to get access to a map illustrating fuel depots on the island on Svalbard 
and surrounding areas during this thesis. However, informants stated that there are a number 
of fuel depots available in the area and with fuelling, it is possible to reach out to the 
northernmost areas of SAR responsibility. These depots are supplied by the Governors` vessel 
Polarsyssel during the summer, according to one informant. 
Some informants stated that fuelling from a depot was very challenging in the winter, while 
others had not experienced any problems. In the summer, several informants agreed that 
fuelling from land based depots in the High Arctic is not a problem. 
 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter the information explored during the study are presented. Research that is 
relevant for emergency response logistics in the High Arctic is further outlined, along with an 
overview of the procedures applying in a rescue operation for a ship in distress. Input from 
informants has represented a valuable addition to better understand the complexity 
surrounding SAR helicopter rescue operations in the Norwegian Search and Rescue area of 
responsibility. 
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5.0 Analysis  
In this chapter, findings made through the empirical studies are discussed and analysed from 
the perspective of existing theory within the discipline of emergency response logistics. The 
relevant variables are discussed and how they affect each other. 
 
5.1 Helicopter base location 
From the empirical data review, and the information gathered from interviews, emergency 
response work in the Norwegian High Arctic pose several challenges, which are not 
necessarily transferrable to other places in the world. 
The overall research question for this thesis was: 
Emergency response logistics in the High Arctic-What is the relation between expedition 
cruise activity and helicopter capabilities in the meaning of: a) location and b) helicopter 
type for mass evacuation in the Norwegian High Arctic?   
To answer this question based on existing data, we had previously found that there is a large 
increase in the expedition cruise activity to the northernmost areas of the Norwegian SAR 
area of responsibility. In the event of a ship in distress north of Svalbard, needing support 
from several outside resources, a mass rescue operation will have to be effectuated.  
The helicopter base location will directly impact the rescue capacity, response time and the 
number of people being evacuated. The natural Arctic surroundings, SAR agreements and 
increased exploration cruise traffic should further influence the base locations. 
To date, there are no regulations concerning co- sailing between ships, and the location of 
Coast guard resources will be uncertain as they are covering an enormous area of control. A 
mass rescue operation will require an immediate large-scale action and the use of resources 
from several organisations. To assist the existing SAR helicopters on Svalbard, helicopters 
from the mainland can be mobilised. The closest options are then to provide Sea King 
helicopters from the bases in Banak or Bodø. According to informants, the transfer takes 
around 8 hours from Banak and up to 12 hours from Bodø.  
Refuelling of the Sea King is likely to be necessary one time for the Banak helicopter and two 
refuelling stops must be done for the Bodø- helicopter during the flight to Svalbard. This also 
calls for the allocation of resources in the mainland bases as there is already a significant gap 
in the SAR helicopter coverage.  
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During an emergency situation, the activation of emergency resources is the first step in the 
process of the emergency response logistics. To ensure the flow of resources to the accident 
site, it is of great importance that the resources are favourably located. During the research 
process of this thesis, is was clear that that in relation to both distances and activity level, the 
coverage for Norway`s northern areas needs strengthening. As one of the informants stated: 
“What we want primarily, is a rescue helicopter base in Troms. The most important thing for 
us is to get this in place” (INF 01) 
And further: 
“It will have great importance for the emergency preparedness.” (INF 01) 
One of the informants clarified concerning the allocation of resources from the mainland and 
with SAR helicopters in Troms, that resource can be sent to Svalbard in addition to the Banak 
helicopter. A great deal of time can be saved in terms of using the emergency resources on the 
accident site. A helicopter from Bodø can then be sent north to Banak as back- up for 
preparedness in Troms and Finnmark County. 
It was evident during the studies, that a base for rescue helicopters in Troms is wanted in 
order to cover the enormous area of emergency response responsibility. One of the informants 
stated that there is a great need for a helicopter base in Troms, given the increased activity and 
large distances. The informant experienced that there was little will to use resources on 
preparedness in the North of Norway from central politicians, and further that “you need to 
have your preparedness founded in the society if you are going to run a business”  
We can see that an additional base for the rescue helicopters in Troms, will have a significant 
effect on the preparedness, as also seen in relation to the increased expedition cruise activities 
outside and north of Svalbard. Locating a base in Troms will contribute to both lowering the 
response time for SAR helicopters supplied to the existing SAR helicopters in Longyearbyen, 
and further strengthen the rescue capacity so more people can be saved during a ship in 
distress in the High Arctic. An additional base can in a phase of mobilisation of resources, 
strengthen the rescue capacity, lower the response time and contribute to the number of 
people being saved. 
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5.2 Helicopter type 
The SAR helicopter type influences the rescue capacity, response time and number of people 
that can be rescued. 
The current Sea Kings are scheduled to be phased out from Norwegian mainland bases while 
the AW101 NAWSARH helicopters are planned to be made operational during the next few 
years. According to informants, the new helicopter type will contribute to increased capacities 
in all areas compared to the Sea King, and it also have the important de-icing feature that the 
current Sea Kings lack. Today`s Sea Kings can`t fly in iced-up conditions, which is not 
optimal for a SAR helicopter operating in the High North. 
We know that time is a decisive factor when speaking in terms of emergency response 
logistics, and the AW101 takes 45 minutes to travel the same distance that the Sea King will 
travel in one hour, according to informants. The response time will be considerably lower if 
new helicopter resources are sent from the mainland to assist an expedition cruise ship north 
of Svalbard. Their special mission system is being designed for Arctic conditions. According 
to one of the informants, the new helicopter will be more efficient and give the crew far better 
tools for SAR operations, and in particular, radars and sensors are highlighted as valuable 
features. Radars are described as unique and are being especially designed both in terms of 
navigation and search operations in harsh environments. The sensor will contribute to far 
better vision, according to one informant. 
One of the informants stated that:  
“The Sea King can fly 50 nautical miles and save 20 persons. The AW101 can fly 250 
nautical miles and pick up 20 persons”.  
If two people are to be rescued, the AW can fly 315 nm, while the Sea King can fly 220 nm. 
During a rescue operation north of Svalbard, this can be an important feature of the new 
AW101. To save several hundred people from the north of Svalbard and fly all of them 
directly to Longyearbyen is not realistic, so a rescue operation that includes transporting 
healthy survivors to a nearby land point must be planned for, according to one of the 
informants. In such cases, the addition of AW101 capacity will be valuable, as the helicopter 
can carry far more people given the correct set up.  
The Super Puma helicopters on Svalbard have de-icing features and represents a steady SAR 
resource on Svalbard. The helicopters are according to one informant: 
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“Primarily set up for SAR, but also serves the Governor in their many services” (INF 09) 
The helicopter also flies ambulance and police services in addition to research missions and as 
support for key government organisations such as Avinor, Telenor and the Coastal 
Administration. The SAR base in Longyearbyen also trains the Coastguard ships in helicopter 
operations, according to one informant. 
The AW101 could also contribute to greater capacities on Svalbard. However, the rescue 
capacity will always be too limited in terms of a mass rescue operation, especially in terms of 
the challenge in the Arctic where there are great transportation distances. In addition to an 
immediate and well-planned operation, a mass rescue operation will also require assistance 
from multiple organisations, such as mainland helicopters. While one informant stated that it 
is important to have helicopters with greater capacities stationed in Longyearbyen, another 
informant expressed that a good solution would be to supplement the base on Svalbard with 
the two AS332L1 AWSARs with a similar additional helicopter and set this up for maximum 
range. 
Any event of a mass evacuation north of Svalbard will be characterised by a large number of 
people in distress, and the normal resources available in search and rescue operations will be 
inadequate. There will thus be a need for additional resources from the mainland. If AW101 is 
stationed in a helicopter base in Troms, this will be a significant addition to the rescue 
resources in an event taking place on an expedition cruise ship,  and contribute to a better 
coordinated rescue operation as it is possible to allocate resources more rapidly and ensure 
preparedness in the mainland while the SAR operation takes place on Svalbard.  
There is no question that the new NAWSARH helicopter will contribute to a strengthened 
rescue capacity, lower response time and furthermore, to transport more people. The Super 
Pumas today represent more suitable helicopters for harsh Arctic environments where icing is 
a challenge. The Sea Kings has to go around mountains to avoid icing, according to 
informants. While this paper does not look at the implications with exchanging the helicopters 
on Svalbard, it is very clear that the AW101 will strengthen the rescue capabilities when SAR 
helicopter resources have to be allocated from the mainland as it can, according to an 
informant, fly directly from the mainland to Longyearbyen. 
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5.3 Response time and the number of people needing evacuation 
The response time and number of people needing evacuation are influenced by helicopter 
type, base location for rescue helicopters and fuel depots in addition to the surrounding 
context including traffic patterns for ships, Arctic climate implications and various SAR 
regulations.  
During the thesis, some of the informants have been asked how they would have planned for 
an emergency response towards an incident involving 400 persons, locates on 80North 
25East of Svalbard 
Sub-question 1: 
What evacuation capacities are required in terms of response time and the number of people 
needing evacuation on board an expedition cruise ship in the Norwegian High North?  
Characteristic for the Arctic are those factors that Lauta et al. (2018) discuss in connection 
with cold disasters governance. One of the traits associated with the High Arctic is the very 
absence of, or distance to, physical and social infrastructure. Vessels in the immediate 
surroundings of a distressed ship are likely to contribute in the salvage, but this may be 
coincidental, and, importantly, weather conditions, darkness and low temperatures may 
contribute to SAR helicopters being the only means of evacuation from the distressed vessel 
to safer surroundings. The call for improvisation is necessary in these situations and as Lauta 
et al. discuss, `time is essential in an emergency but especially crucial in cold climates`. An 
informant stated: 
“.. the ship does what it can to keep people alive. To keep them safe, preferably dry. Once you 
get wet in the Artic, the survival rate drops drastically” (INF 01) 
Helicopters will probably stop to refuel during a mass evacuation, to and from the distressed 
vessel. Helicopters being mobilised from the mainland today also need refueling during the 
flight on the way over to Svalbard.  It has previously been stated by informants that 
mobilising helicopters from the mainland will take from 9-12 hours with the current Sea 
King. The new AW101 can reduce the transportation time by 15 minutes per hour and does 
not need to refuel while flying to Svalbard, according to one informant, so this will shorten 
the time used for transportation significantly. An additional helicopter base in Troms will 
contribute to less time being spent by the SAR resources in the north of Norway to the 
accident site. However, 400 people needing evacuation with helicopters will nevertheless take 
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hours. Significant time will pass if the incident occurs this far to the north. The Arctic context 
has, according to Young and Lauta et al. (2018), an institutional and political landscape 
working both together and against each other. Norway is a member of several SAR 
collaborations that have been found useful and can ask for assistance from the neighbouring 
Arctic countries. The same challenges, however, continue to be relevant, such as distances 
and available SAR helicopter resources.  
According to one informant, you should always consider the set-up of the helicopter before 
departing. “You need to plan in the best possible way with the information you`ve got 
available as to what is expected at the site of the emergency” Again, improvisation is called 
for when responding to a mission requiring a mass evacuation and in particular, in a High 
Arctic context when many people need rescuing. Time is a factor that influences the ability to 
reach people within a reasonable period. However, time is not on your side when it comes to 
being rescued in the High Arctic with large distances and cold climate. Optimisation of the 
process of deploying SAR units may contribute to lowering the time used for response. SAR 
helicopters with larger capacities what speed, passengers and range concerns, and therefore 
represent a valuable contribution to the essential time factor in terms of evacuation of more 
people. 
 
5.4 Rescue helicopter coverage in case of a ship evacuation 
Rescue helicopter coverage today in the High Arctic affects the overall rescue capacity in the 
northernmost areas of the world where there is a continuous increase in exploration cruises, 
and no requirements have been implemented concerning SAR helicopter capabilities in the 
maritime industry as seen in the offshore sector. The market for exploration cruises continues 
to grow and at least 30 polar classed exploration ships are scheduled for delivery. We can see 
that exploration cruises now travel areas further to the north and east, and during their 
journeys these also pass through Norwegian areas of SAR responsibilities. Questions raised in 
this concern are therefore relevant: 
Sub-question 2   
In which areas is there a need for rescue helicopter coverage in case a ship evacuation is 
necessary? Increasing cruise and maritime transport activities in Arctic waters continue to 
expand Norway` s area of SAR responsibilities  
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Rescue helicopters are vital what ship evacuation concerns, and even though it will be 
practically impossible, according to several informants, to evacuate 400 people within 
reasonable time from 80 North and 35East to Longyearbyen, improvisation and adaption of 
resources can contribute to people being rescued to temporary bases. Svalbard has a number 
of helicopter depots that can contribute to operation for longer periods of time during a mass 
evacuation. We can see from the analytical model in this paper, that helicopter coverage is 
influenced by helicopter type, base location and fuel deport location.  
The interaction between the units during a phase with several helicopters on site is of high 
importance. The rescue helicopter preparedness needs to correlate to the level of activity in 
the area. As one of the informants stated: “imagine how hard it would be to employ people on 
offshore units if they knew there was no way they could be rescued if they needed evacuation” 
When no other options are close enough to rescue people within an acceptable time frame, 
SAR helicopters may be the only solution to reach survivors. Emergency planning can be 
according to Canton (2007) be based on realistic possibilities and an incident involving an 
exploration cruise ship must be planned for, because the activity and the possibility for an 
accident is present. 
 
5.5 Contextual factors  
The contextual factors are those that influence the need for SAR helicopter capabilities in 
order to uphold an acceptable rescue capacity. 
Sub-question 3  
How do contextual factors such as weather and distance to hospitals influence evacuation 
capacity needs? How do evacuation capacity needs influence helicopter capabilities in the 
terms of a) helicopter SAR capacity and b) location?   
We know that exploration cruises are increasing in the High Arctic. We also know that the 
Arctic calls for a cold risk governance. Theories concerning emergency logistics are still, 
according to Jiang and Yuang (2019) still at an infancy stage. An emergency may cause a 
large- scale impact and have a number of challenges such as complexity, multiparty 
collaboration problems, critical time requirements and allocation of scarce resources and lack 
of infrastructure. These challenges are much more present in the High Arctic, where for 
example, weather conditions may severely affect an SAR operation. One informant stated: 
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“We have challenges with icing, mountains and extreme cold in the winter. If you do not get 
rescued here, you die in no time. We have challenges like sea conditions and drifting ice that 
affect the operation” (INF 08) 
The distance to hospitals is also a factor in terms of injured and hypothermic people. The 
SAR helicopters have a doctor onboard and the SAR helicopters in Longyearbyen recently 
got anaesthetic specialists on their units. In severe cases, taking place far from shore the 
contextual factors such as distance to medical facilities may strongly affect the outcome of a 
rescue operation.  
 
5.5.1 Helicopter SAR capacities  
SAR helicopter resources with sufficient capacities are vital to the preparedness in an area 
with lack of infrastructure. The AW101 will represent a strengthening of the capacities when 
being phased into preparedness on the mainland bases. The features on the new helicopters 
are designed for an Arctic environment, and one informant claims that the unit will receive 
better real-time information of the awaiting conditions. Information is provided continuously, 
according to one informant, so the crew can focus on planning the rescue mission on their 
way to the casualty. 
One of the informants also highlighted the importance of situational awareness local 
knowledge when discussing rescue in the High Arctic: 
“You have to be well informed and have local knowledge to operate here. We have many 
secondary hazards with landing” (INF 08) 
 
5.5.2 Location 
The location of the accident will have significant influence as to when, and how many, SAR 
resources can assist.  
As no Norwegian SAR helicopters are located on bases close to the SAR area of 
responsibility in the north of Svalbard, close to 35 East, the SAR helicopters will have to rely 
on receiving fuel from either fuel depots on shore or from fuel- carrying ships in the area. One 
informant talked of so- called Helicopter InFlight Refueling: 
“We have ships along the way we can either land and take fuel from or do HIFR if the 
weather is too poor to land” (INF 08) 
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The location farther to the north-east of Norwegian SAR area of responsibility is nevertheless 
very vulnerable in relation to available SAR helicopter capacities. Specifically, this concerns 
mobilising sufficient helicopters to the site in an event of an evacuation from an exploration 
cruise ship. Strengthening the preparedness with adequate SAR helicopter resources appear to 
be an expedient way to meet some of the challenges arising with operating in the High Arctic. 
 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter the variables influencing the rescue capacity, response time and number of 
people that can be saved are discussed in an analytical context in view of the research model. 
Factors such as helicopter type, base location and fuel depots are influencing the capacities. 
The surrounding Arctic context calls for measures, adaption and improvisation in SAR 
missions. Evacuation of several hundred people from an exploration cruise ship to 
Longyearbyen with helicopters was not found to be realistic as there is not sufficient 
helicopter capacity to transport that many people from a ship far from shore within reasonable 
time. Temporary stay for passengers on nearby bases either on land or on a ship was 
mentioned by several informants as the best resolution. Strengthening of SAR helicopter 
capacity and capabilities to support activity in the High North was further found to be very 
important in a region characterised by increased commercial activity and lack of 
infrastructure. 
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6.0 Concluding remarks 
There appears to be unanimous agreement among SAR actors in the High North, that the 
preparedness must be strengthened, based on increased exploration cruise activity and also 
current activities taking place in the High Arctic.  
In particular, SAR helicopter capabilities on the mainland bases that can contribute in events 
arising north of Svalbard are highlighted. While there are different opinions whether the SAR 
helicopters on Svalbard needs to be upgraded, an additional SAR helicopter base on the 
mainland will in any case be a valuable contribution to the preparedness in the High North. 
The matter is often a question of financial resources and funding in order to obtain a more 
robust preparedness. One informant stated that a sufficient understanding of the consequences 
from a serious event occurring in High Arctic must be established. At the same time 
Norwegian rescue history shows that nothing happens with the preparedness resources unless 
a larger event occurs, the informant further expressed.  
The logistics surrounding an emergency response related to a mass evacuation, will, in any 
case depend on resources being mobilised from a number of SAR actors, where the SAR 
helicopters represents the fastest and most effective response in terms of time and evacuation 
from a ship. As maritime regulations have not included measures such as co- sailing, 
helicopter capacities are likely to be the main contribution in the event of an accident 
involving an exploration cruise ship with several hundred passengers. 
The main principles for Norwegian crisis management and preparedness are responsibility, 
subsidiarity, equivalency and cooperation. If these principles were to be followed, SAR 
resources strengthening the preparedness in the High Arctic should be provided to include all 
of the Norwegian population and those visiting the area. What has been obvious while writing 
this thesis, is that there is a need to cooperate among actors in the Norwegian Arctic to create 
understanding on a national level of the need for emergency resources. The High Arctic 
represents a vast area, and to provide sufficient emergency resources, must be a priority. As 
one informant stated: 
“Distance is a key factor for SAR preparedness and capacity” 
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7.0 Recommendations for further studies 
An event leading to a mass evacuation from north of Svalbard will require cooperation and 
efforts from multiple SAR actors. Several co-operation exercises are already done and in 
progress. A study with focus on training taking place among SAR actors in the event of a 
mass-rescue operation in the High Arctic, can make a valuable addition to the development of 
the preparedness and emergency response.  
Further, a study on the measures done by those companies operating cruise- and exploration 
ships in terms of safety measures and contingency planning could have made an interesting 
study in the future. 
Other recommendations for further studies may include the use of units such as the Orion or 
Dorniers on Svalbard to create situational awareness, and further explore if the preparedness 
would have been strengthened if these were to be enrolled as part of the permanent national 
preparedness system 
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Appendix I: List of Documents 
 
Reference Title Origin Type Date 
The Agreement Agreement on 
Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search 
and Rescue in the 
Arctic 
Member states 
of the Arctic 
Council 
Legally 
binding 
agreement 
12.05.2011 
SAR 
Cooperation 
Plan 
SAR Co-operation 
Plan 
-Plans for Co-
operation between 
SAR services and 
Passenger ships in 
an emergency 
JRCC North 
Norway & 
JRCC South 
Norway 
Co-operation 
plan  
February 
2019 
NAWSARH 
Project 
NAWSARH 
Project 
(Anskaffelse av 
nye 
redningshelikoptre) 
Leonardo Tender 
information 
22.10.2014 
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Appendix II: E-mail to Informants EN/ NO 
 
Dear Mr/ Ms. 
I am currently in the process of writing my master`s thesis in Societal Safety and Emergency 
Management at North University, Bodø. 
My thesis has two research topics: the emergency response logistics necessary to respond to 
maritime accidents in polar waters and logistics effectiveness concerning the base locations of 
Norwegian Rescue helicopters. 
I am contacting potential informants working in emergency response preparedness 
organisations to seek further information about these topics. 
All the informants will be made anonymous in the thesis. The informant will in any case be 
given the opportunity to verify quotes intended for use prior to the thesis being submitted. 
I would highly appreciate if you are willing to help me by answering these questions, either 
through a short interview or by e-mail. 
I would be very grateful if you are willing to contribute to this thesis as an informant. 
Kind regards, 
Lisbeth Andreassen Harila 
314771@student.nord.no 
Phone: +47 95 75 75 95 
Masters Degree candidate in Societal Safety and Emergency Management 
Nord University, Bodø 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Hei, 
Jeg skriver for tiden på min mastergradsoppgave i Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap ved Nord 
Universitet, Bodø. 
Oppgaven min har to forskningsemner; Beredskapslogistikk; hvilke ressurser er nødvendig 
for å respondere på maritime ulykker i arktiske farvann og logistikk knyttet til plasseringen av 
redningshelikopterbaser på fastlands-Norge og Svalbard. 
Jeg kontakter derfor potensielle informanter som arbeider i norske beredskapsorganisasjoner 
for å søke mer informasjon om temaene. 
Alle informantene vil bli gjort anonyme i oppgaven og informanten vil i alle tilfeller få 
tilsendt en sitatkontroll før avhandlingen blir levert. Opptak gjort for transkribering av 
intervju vil slettes umiddelbart.  
Jeg vil sette stor pris på om du er villig til å hjelpe meg ved å svare på disse spørsmålene, 
enten gjennom et kort intervju eller via e-post eller telefon. 
 
Vennlig hilsen, 
Lisbeth Andreassen Harila 
314771@student.nord.no 
Telefon: 95 75 75 95 
Mastergradsstudent i samfunnssikkerhet og kriseledelse,  
Nord Universitet, Bodø 
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Appendix III Information letter about the research project 
 
Deltakelse i Erfaringsbasert Mastergradsprosjekt 
«Emergency response logistics in the High Arctic» 
 
Dette er informasjon til deg som har sagt seg villig til å delta i et forskningsprosjekt hvor 
formålet er utarbeiding av Masteroppgave hvor man undersøker beredskapslogistikk ifm. 
maritim hendelse nord for Svalbard og helikoptertype og baselokasjon i Høyarktiske strøk. I 
dette skrivet gis informasjon om prosjektmål og hva deltakelse innebærer. 
 
Formål 
Formålet med undersøkelsen er å skrive en erfaringsbasert Masteroppgave ved Nord 
Universitet i Bodø. 
 
Følgende spørsmål undersøkes i oppgaven: 
 
`Emergency response logistics in the High Arctic - What is the relation between expedition 
cruise activity and helicopter capabilities I the meaning of a) location and b) helicopter type 
for mass evacuation in the Norwegian High Arctic?` 
 
Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet? 
Nord Universitet i Bodø, Universitetsalléen 11, 8049 Bodø, Norge 
 
Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta? 
Utvalget som deltar i intervju er anbefalt av veileder på Masteroppgaven samt gjennom 
referanse fra beredskapsnettverk. 
 
 
Hva innebærer det for deg å delta? 
• Hvis du velger å delta i prosjektet, innebærer det at et personlig- eller gruppeintervju 
gjennomføres med aktører innenfor beredskap med bruk av skriftlige notateter. 
Enkelte av intervjuene gjøres med lydopptak for senere transkribering. Opptak 
avklares på forhånd i intervjusituasjoner. Eventuelle opptak slettes umiddelbart etter 
transkribering. Aktuell informasjon fra intervju blir oversendt deg for kontroll. Du kan 
når som helst be om at innhold endres, rettes eller slettes. 
 
Det er frivillig å delta 
Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Du kan når som helst trekke samtykke tilbake uten å oppgi 
noen grunn. Alle opplysninger om deg vil i alle tilfeller bli anonymisert. Det vil ikke ha noen 
negative konsekvenser for deg hvis velger å trekke deg.  
 
Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger  
60 
Vi vil bare bruke opplysningene gitt av deg til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Vi 
behandler opplysningene konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket. 
 
Deltakerne vil i oppgaven anonymiseres og bli referert til som «SAR- aktører».  Kun godkjent 
materiale vil bli publisert.  
 
Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet? 
Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 15.5.2019. Alle eventuelle opplysninger om 
intervjudeltakerne slettes før innlevering av Masteroppgaven. 
 
Dine rettigheter 
Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til: 
- innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg, 
- å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,  
- få slettet personopplysninger om deg, 
- få utlevert en kopi av dine personopplysninger (dataportabilitet), og 
- å sende klage til personvernombudet eller Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine 
personopplysninger. 
Ingen personopplysninger er registrert i forbindelse med denne oppgaven. 
 
Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg? 
Vi behandler kun opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke.  
Ingen personopplysninger behandles i denne oppgaven. 
 
På oppdrag fra Nord Universitet i Bodø har NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS 
vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med 
personvernregelverket.  
 
Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer? 
Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med: 
• Nord Universitet ved Professor Odd Jarl Borch, odd.j.borch@nord.no  
• Vårt personvernombud: personvernombud@nord.no  
• NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS, på epost (personverntjenester@nsd.no) 
eller telefon: 55 58 21 17. 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
Lisbeth A. Harila     
Student  
Nord Universitet 
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Appendix IV: Interview guides for pre-structured interviews 
Emergency response logistics in the High Arctic - What is the relation between expedition 
cruise activity and helicopter capabilities in the meaning of a) location and b) helicopter type 
for mass evacuation in the Norwegian High Arctic?   
Sub-question 1: 
What evacuation capacities are required in terms of response time and the number of persons 
needing evacuation on board an expedition cruise ship in the Norwegian High North?    
Sub-question 2   
In which areas is there a need for rescue helicopter coverage in case a ship evacuation is 
necessary? Increasing cruise and maritime transport activities in Arctic waters continue to 
expand Norway` s area of SAR response responsibilities  
Sub-question 3  
How do contextual factors such as weather and distance to hospitals influence evacuation 
capacity needs? How do evacuation capacity needs influence helicopter capabilities in the 
terms of a) helicopter SAR capacity and b) location?   
 
 
INF 01 (SAR management) 
1. How would you describe the role of your organisation if you are notified of an emergency 
on a vessel with the necessary evacuation in Arctic waters, north of Svalbard in the 
Norwegian SAR area East to 35? 
2. What capacities will typically be mobilised at an event where it is necessary to evacuate 
400 passengers from a cruise ship north of Svalbard? 
3. How would you describe the situation of available emergency resources in the area? 
4. Are there Russian SAR helicopter capacities in the area that may be appropriate to 
mobilise? - Will Norway be asked to assist in a major rescue operation in the Russian sector? 
5. In which areas, in your opinion, is there a need for coverage by rescue helicopter or 
emergency vessel in case a necessary evacuation situation occurs? 
6. Which helicopter resources are desirable and where should they be located? 
7. How will an action in the Norwegian zone east of Svalbard be formed, hour by hour, with a 
combination of aircraft, helicopters and vessel resources? 
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INF 02 (SAR operation)  
INF 03(SAR system operation) 
1. What features does AW101 have in bad weather in compared to Super Puma and Sea 
King? 
2. What kind of sensors are important on board the AW101 versus the Super Puma and the 
Sea King? 
3. What are the challenges when it comes to weather conditions for flying and evacuation 
from a boat? 
4. What are the most important threats when it comes to natural conditions in Svalbard? 
5. What communication tools does one use in an action, and what kind of limitations do these 
have? 
a. Between the helicopters 
b. Between helicopters and vessel to be evacuated 
c. With the Governor of Longyearbyen 
d. With the Main Rescue Centre 
6. What are the safety margins and routines for evacuation from boats (visibility, wind) in 
order to enter and raise passengers? 
7. How long does it take to lift a person? 
8. What are the safety margins and routines for evacuation from a boat (visibility, wind, 
meandering, stamping) for landing on a helicopter deck? 
9. How would one set up a rescue operation for a cruise ship with 400 passengers east of  
Nordaustlandet away towards Victoria Island 80 ° N 35 ° 'E? 
10. How many helicopters should participate in such a mass evacuation? 
11. How would one co-ordinate these helicopters? 
12. How long does it take to fly helicopters up from the mainland to Longyarbyen and further 
to 80 N 35`E ? 
13. If you are going to transport passengers to Longyearbyen, how long will it take you to get 
back when bunkering? 
14. How long does it take to bunker the helicopter on a depot? 
15. How much fuel is stored at each depot? 
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INF 05 (SAR organisation)  
1. Can you briefly tell me about your organisation`s purpose, background and development in 
number of members? 
2. What can you tell about the joint exercises? 
3. How would you describe the development in recent years of port calls by larger passenger 
vessels in Longyearbyen? 
4. Do you see an expansion in operation areas for the vessels? (ref. Hurtigruten) 
5. What are the main challenges for cruise traffic around Svalbard? (e.g. communication, 
logistics, distances) 
6. What requirements are applicable to vessel masters` calling at Longyearbyen with larger 
passenger vessels? 
7. Do you receive reports of maritime incidents occurring on passenger ships? (reference 
made to the Operational guidelines and accidents, incidents and non-compliance) 
- What kind of events are typical in such reports? (medical, technical failure, bottom touch, 
etc.) 
8. How would you describe the emergency preparedness resources on Svalbard if a major 
maritime event were to occur? 
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INF 06 (SAR management) 
INF 09 (SAR unit management) 
1. How would you describe the SAR helicopter preparedness in Svalbard? 
2. What capabilities does the helicopter have in terms of carrying range and passenger 
capacity? 
a. for short lifting from vessel to shore, e.g.  Viking Sky 
b. for longer trips  
3. The event of 
a. Can you tell about the operation and what experiences you did? 
b. How long could the operation have lasted without bunkering? 
c. Where was the nearest bunkers depot concerning Northguider operation,and how long 
would fueling have taken under the current weather conditions? 
4. How would one have set up a rescue operation that involves a mass evacuation from a 
cruise ship with 400 passengers east of Nordaustlandet away towards Victoria Island ( 80 ° N 
35 ° E)? 
5. How long do the helicopters need on average to get mobilised and in the air from the time 
of the alarm sounding , and how long did this take in connection with the Northguider 
grounding? 
6. What kind of limitations apply as to the following: 
a. How long the pilots can be in action for 
b. What conditions one can operate under (rules for visibility and wind limitations) 
7. How many helicopters should participate in a mass evacuation, and how long will 
helicopters take when journeying from 
a) Banak 
b) Bodø 
8. What is important training for you as an operator in the future, in connection with increased 
cruise traffic in the north? 
9. If one is to strengthen the SAR helicopter preparedness in Svalbard, what measures should 
be taken? (more helicopters, longer-range helicopters, etc.) 
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INF 07 (SAR operation) 
1. a. Can you tell about the operation and what experiences you did? 
2. What are the biggest operational challenges in the High Arctic? 
3. How long do the helicopters need on average to get mobilised and in the air from the 
time of the alarm sounding? 
4. How do you prepare for events? 
 
INF 09 (SAR operation) 
1. Can you tell me about important factors surrounding SAR- operations in the High 
Arctic? 
2. Mass rescue operations; how can you prepare? 
3. How can the emergency preparedness in the High Arctic be strengthened?  
 
 
 
